Владислав Педдер – The Experience of the Tragic (страница 9)

Further Reflections on Free Will with Lawrence Krauss

After the release of the book Determined, in a two-hour podcast with Robert Sapolsky and Lawrence Krauss, the main focus is on the connection between the illusion of free will, neurobiology, and concepts related to quantum physics. Sapolsky once again emphasizes that free will is an illusion determined by biological processes and the laws of physics. This viewpoint is also supported by arguments that even the probabilistic nature of quantum physics cannot undermine determinism. (Sapolsky; Krauss, 2023)

Determinism and Quantum Physics

During the conversation, Krauss raises the argument concerning quantum uncertainty, frequently invoked to support the idea of free will. He emphasizes that uncertainty at the quantum level is interpreted as the probabilistic nature of events not due to a rejection of determinism but because we lack the instruments to predict exact outcomes. Sapolsky concurs, noting that even if quantum physics introduces an element of randomness, it does not create freedom of choice for the subject. No quantum “noisy” event in the brain produces a conscious and independent action.

The main arguments consist in the illusion of control manifesting in the fact that neurobiological processes are initiated before we become aware of our actions, confirmed by studies demonstrating that neural activity precedes our decisions. The probabilistic character of quanta indicates that even if random events exist in nature, they cannot serve as the foundation of free will since they are not under the individual’s control. The evolutionary basis of behavior, as Sapolsky emphasizes, lies in the fact that even highly developed social processes have a biological foundation, including such notions as morality and responsibility.

Here is how Sapolsky describes this in Chapter Ten, “Is Your Free Will Random?”:

“Putting aside cruel randomness, can quantum effects truly influence behavior? For example, the uncertainty releasing magnesium from the glutamate receptor does not significantly affect excitation at the synapse. Even strong excitation of a single synapse is insufficient to trigger an action potential in the neuron… A dendrite in one glutamatergic synapse contains approximately 200 receptors. We consider quantum events affecting one receptor within such a synapse. By conservative estimates, a neuron contains from 10,000 to 50,000 such synapses… This gives us between 20 and 100 trillion glutamate receptors… Applying the same calculations to hypothetical microtubules, allegedly responsible for consciousness… Thus, when transitioning from quantum uncertainty at the subatomic level to the scale of the brain producing behavior, a scale problem arises: a staggering number of random events would need to occur simultaneously, in one place, and in one direction to exert a significant influence. experts agree that a more probable scenario is that any single quantum event is lost in the ‘noise’ of an enormous number of other quantum events occurring at different times and in different directions.”

By the end of the podcast, Sapolsky and Krauss reach a consensus that quantum physics ideas do not contradict biological determinism. The question of free will become philosophical: we live as if it exists, despite a lack of evidence supporting it. This approach allows focusing on practical measures, such as revising approaches to punishment and education, which Sapolsky discusses in detail in his book.

The works of Robert Sapolsky, Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst and Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will, reveals a profound interconnection between biology, behavior, and determinism, constructing a comprehensive explanation of human nature. These books bring us to the realization that habitual notions of free will and moral responsibility require reconsideration.

Behave shows that human behavior is shaped through a complex interaction of neurobiological, genetic, hormonal, and social factors. Every action is rooted in a chain of events beginning long before conscious choice, including instantaneous hormonal responses and long-term environmental influences. This book aids in understanding how our best and worst actions are predetermined by a multifaceted biological foundation.

In Determined, Sapolsky takes the next step, asserting that free will is no more than a cognitive illusion necessary for social functioning but incompatible with scientific data. Neuroscience confirms that our decisions are not the result of independent choice, and quantum randomness adds no freedom since it remains outside the subject’s control.

These works possess not only philosophical significance but practical implications. If our actions are predetermined, then it is necessary to reconsider systems of justice, education, and social responsibility. This approach enables a focus on eliminating factors contributing to antisocial behavior and creating conditions conducive to empathy and cooperation.

Sapolsky’s perspective proposes a transformation in the way we view human relationships, the legal system, and our own lives: understanding that behind every behavior lie invisible biological and external forces can radically alter our approach to how we perceive ourselves and others.

He emphasizes that all our decisions result from biological and ecological factors beyond our influence, and this renders the traditional system of rewards and punishments meaningless. Sapolsky straightforwardly states that given determinism, moral judgments and systems of justice require complete reevaluation.

Having established the foundations of neurobiological determinism with Sapolsky, we now turn to philosophical concepts attempting to reconcile our inner experience of the “I as a free agent” with the fact that all our decisions and actions are conditioned by external and internal regularities.

Within the analytic tradition, one of the most influential approaches to this problem is compatibilism – the doctrine of the compatibility of free will and causal determinism. Classical compatibilism dates back to David Hume, who observed that freedom does not require the “breaking” of causal chains but merely the absence of external coercion and the capacity to act according to one’s desires and beliefs. In this vein, freedom is defined functionally: an agent is free when able to act based on one’s own motives rather than under external pressure.

In the 20th century, Daniel Dennett developed the idea of compatibilism in his book Freedom Evolves. Dennett suggested that evolution has created in our brains complex cognitive mechanisms capable of “planning” and “controlling” behavior – that is, forming predictions, evaluating alternatives, and changing course (Dennett, 2003). These mechanisms allow us to sustain social institutions and moral norms: we hold each other responsible because we can predict our own and others’ behavior and build interactions on these forecasts. At the same time, “will” remains determined – it is simply embedded in a system capable of self-reflection.

But what does freedom rely on, according to compatibilists? First, on the fact that internal causes (our desires and beliefs) are perceived by us as “ours,” even if formed by genetics, upbringing, and environment. Second, on the capacity for self-restraint and reevaluation of one’s motivations: we can bring our impulses to a “critical level” of consciousness and reconsider their significance. Thus, responsible agents capable of acting in long-term interests emerge – even if “long-term interests” and “motives” themselves are conditioned by antecedent causes.

Nevertheless, compatibilism faces a profound aporia: we did not choose our desires, design our motivational system, or establish the values that then determine our actions. If we were not the authors of our internal causes, how justified is it to ascribe moral responsibility to us? In the most radical version of this critique (developed, for example, by Galen Strawson), genuine responsibility becomes impossible because any attempt to “account to oneself” requires a meta-cause, and this meta-cause, in turn, requires an even deeper cause – ad infinitum.

On the other hand, opponents of compatibilism appeal to indeterminism: allegedly, random quantum fluctuations in the brain can provide a “glimmer” of genuine freedom. However, such an argument substitutes freedom with randomness. If an action results from unpredictable “noise” at synapses, it ceases to be a conscious choice and turns into a roll of the dice, for which we also cannot bear responsibility. Moreover, as modern philosophers note, quantum unpredictability is erased at the scale of the brain, where tens of trillions of receptors and synapses generate too much “noise” for it to convert into meaningful decision-making.

Compatibilists, striving to show that determinism and free will do not exclude each other, often refer to neurobiological mechanisms of self-control – in particular, the functioning of inhibitory neural circuits. One of the main arguments is that a person is capable, at a critical moment, to “stop oneself” – and this, they say, is the manifestation of freedom. For example, they point to the human ability to cancel already initiated actions within a very brief interval – ranging from several hundred to tens of milliseconds. This effect is well-studied in stop-signal task experiments, in which subjects are instructed to perform an action but then suddenly receive a signal requiring immediate cessation. Successful inhibition is interpreted as an expression of “higher” control, not reducible to mere impulse.