Сергей Девятов – The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials (страница 7)

All of this could have been predicted. But in that case Nikolay Berdyaev could not have been amazed by the «superhuman efforts» of Lenin, who in the span of five months came from being a marginalized party functionary to leading a massive national transformation. He called for the communization of all property, discipline, responsibility, and a complete restructuring. He exposed revolutionary phrase mongering, anarchic tastes and making «conjurations over an abyss.»

Indeed the most pitiless truth was discovered in the spring of 1918: it was impossible to overcome the crisis in the situation when each province represented «an independent republic,» while there was individual and group egoism, and anarchy ruled the market. Nothing but strong central power was able to reestablish lost economic ties and revered tries with the countryside rehabilitate a broken financial system, establish order and discipline.

In their practical activity the Bolsheviks too resorted to force, but on a much more massive scale then ever before witnessed in Russian history. At first forced was used systematically only in the limited patches of the most critical areas of supplying food. These methods continued the authoritarian tendencies of the war period. However, from May-June 1918 – a period, when there was a threat of restoration and counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks openly choose the way of defending soviet «strength» by any available means.

It is clear that the gradual retreat of both revolutionaries and their adversaries into «emergency» policy of force and violence was preceded by a long chain of events. The question «Who was the first to start?» usually leads nowhere. It is important to define the logic of the escalation violence itself because only that type of knowledge can inform politicians of the dangers in their decisions and actions. Perhaps we could accept the thesis «any violence is evil.» But when social confrontation reaches the point of civil war, society disintegrates. At such moments enemies and adversaries are kept beyond the moral, they are considered «inhuman», to which common human standards don’t apply. Then mere statements on the immorality of violence cannot stop anyone.

Long lasting extreme conditions were beneficial for the bureaucracy and state machinery because they received ever increasing power. This was the situation in 1905–1907, but it was even more evident after October 1917, when the old party Guard consisting of professional revolutionists exhausted itself. When new groups, led by «the common man,» arrived, the question of whether Russia was actually ready for a new regime became acute. Holding important posts, «the common man» introduced a whole range of new understandings to professional revolutionary activity, most notably the golden age of bureaucracy.

When directly connected to different social groups, bureaucracy is not dreadful. It’s not dreadful even when people infected by some anarchical illnesses come to the front. But when «the common man» is in charge, bureaucracy, the eternal problem of Russia comes to the fore. In fact, as Nikolay Osinskiy wrote to Lenin in October 1919: «the people actually bringing the dry algebraic formulas (created by Lenin) into practice are either poor managers or good functionaries (and often even bad functionaries). Only «bureaucrats» work at the most important posts. For important jobs we have a large amount of those who «know how to be on good terms with others», without hurting them.»

In bureaucracy form dominates over content. Bureaucracy in Russia became not only archaism but in a way a compensating machine in conditions when superficial forms do not have a proper support in industrial or technological potential. The efforts to artificially maintain sagging quasi-socialistic forms required social power. It was the Bureaucracy and national security forces which came to embody this power.

Is it Possible to avoid the Catastrophe of Revolution? Often the history of revolution turns out to be nothing more than a code of notions about revolutions. These histories characterize the mentality of those who reconstruct history, rather than the real history of the revolution itself. It seems clear enough, however that the «mystery» of Russian revolutions lies in the passion for extremes, a hope and belief that at in one stroke all problems can be solved, that unwanted past stays buried, and right away something new will be created.

Only smart policy can resist the logic of Russian radicalism and maximalism. Where there isn’t enough of it, an extraordinary commissar or commissioner appears. Yes, Russian revolutionaries along with Saint-Just might: the nature of events themselves leads us to results that we never had in mind. However, before 1905 as well as before 1917, reality contained a large diversity of evolutionary paths. But most importantly, history demonstrates that Russia could have been reformed. These are the true reforms that can prevent catastrophic situations; they represent the best way to break the spirit of revolution and lead its energy in a peaceful direction without turning towards radicalism.

However, nowadays most historians admit that the link between revolution and reform is more complicated, than it was once believed. Reforms can prevent a revolution but in certain cases they can give it an incentive. Late or half-completed reforms may stoke the flames of revolution. To avoid this, one shouldn’t be scared into not recognizing defects in the system and the need for corrections. By looking for excuses – functionaries are to blame, local officials are to blame, overzealous bureaucrats are the problem – sooner or later the blame will inevitably concentrate on the state itself.

Revolutionary forces can be held in check not only by the state, but also by society. Society is not a rival of to the state but a partner equally responsible for finding solutions in critical situations. It is society that is able to exercise pressure on the authorities; society can bring about timely renovation of the political elite, create a system of renovation and control its functions.

Revolution cannot be cast away, no matter how much someone wishes to do so. The heritage of revolution is still in institutions of the present. The revolution is no longer seen as infallible. Yes, it is true that its image is now vague and unclear, but the symbols of revolution have not disappeared, have not lost their value, regardless of subjective intentions of those who wish to control the past and the present. The Revolution will always have adherents, who see in it the realization of such ideals as freedom, equality and fraternity of people and nations. The revolution will also have adversaries unwilling to forget radical tendencies. The question posed by great humanist Jean-Jaures remains unanswered: «Revolution is a barbaric form of progress. Will we have a chance to see the day when the form of human progress will be truly humane?»

Theme 4

EMERGENCY MEASURES AND THE «EXTREME EMERGENCY REGIME» IN THE SOVIET REPUBLIC AND OTHER STATE FORMATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIA, 1918‒1920

In 1917, a democratic republic with maximum political legality began to take shape. It was the first time that the state began to reject authoritarian mechanisms; retributive policies declined; police and the secret political police force «Okhranka» were disbanded. That was the moment when two alternative forms of democracy came into sight on the political arena: one of them was Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, an unofficial but highly legitimate body elected by workers, soldiers, and sailors to represent their interests – but it was untested. The other was the Provisional Government, which based itself on Duma (that is, parliamentary) traditions and embraced European models. This government promised to convene a «Constituent Assembly» in order to establish a new form of government for Russia. The holders of both types promised people to pull the country out of World War I and overcome the extreme crisis the country found itself in. Moreover, all sides promised to do so without resorting to a regime of so-called «high state of alert» based on the Statute on Measures to Protect State Order and Public Peace (the security law of August 14, 1881), the rules of which were so intimately known to the majority of territories of the Russian Empire since 1881.

History gave the possibility to test this crucial statement both to the Bolsheviks and their political opponents. Soon the idea of democracy lost widespread public support. The Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government failed compromise or find agreement on basis issues, and subsequently found themselves in the state of crisis. Both sides turned to seemingly outmoded forms of authoritarian politics. The country had to choose between two kinds of dictatorship: «the Whites» and «the Reds», and not between two forms of democracy, based on either the Provisional Government or the Petrograd Soviet. Soviet democracy was transformed into a one-party militarized dictatorship.. The members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly began to cooperate with, and later knuckled under to, the «white» restorationist generals.