Евгений Чернышев – Kaliningrad – an ambivalent transnational region within a European-Russian scope (страница 6)

I assume that the cultural space has integrative and evaluative properties. I share the point of view of cultural scientist Lotman74. He defined cultural space as a shared memory space from the standpoint of semiotic concept of culture. That is, culture is a collective memory and collective intelligence, which produces a supra-individual mechanism for storing and transferring of traditional texts, and developing of new texts.

However, time transforms the system of cultural codes, and thus changing the paradigm of memory – it is particularly the case within the Kaliningrad regional culture in the context of discussions about the relation to the German cultural heritage of the former East Prussia. Memory function allows restoring cultural dimensions. In the cultural space can coexist cultural dimensions of the present and of the past: their dialogue. It is about the coexistence of cultures, intercultural dialogue, which – given the meaning the pogranichnost of the regional culture and its historical specificity – is of particular importance for this study.

I distinguish and implement the following spatial couples, which, in my opinion, are specific especially for Kaliningrad regional culture: mainland/enclave, surrounding state/half-enclave, Russia/West, center /periphery, Königsberg/Kaliningrad.

Results of empirical studies show that in the case of Kaliningrad regional culture, in contrast to the typical Russian dichotomy of East/West and Europe/Asia, following semantic pairs have fundamental meaning – West (Kaliningrad region) /East (Russia) and Europe/ Russia (Kaliningrad region).

Identity: Transnational region

It should be taken into account that potential rivalries and conflicts between local, regional, national and supranational levels of co-operation must not be ignored. At best, these levels complement each other, creating a European identity in diversity75. We can find the increased attention to the «Europe of the regions»76 in numerous studies. Generally, this attention is directed to the «interaction of memory culture and regional history»77, as well as to political, economic, and social forces involved in constituting a region and establishing regional identities78.

As I turned to the issue of the region and to Kaliningrad region as an example of it, than would be taken into account that the meaning attached to region can vary quite dramatically depending on the perspective from which it is considered. As Michael Keating notes, «there is consensus that the term refers to space, the notion of space itself can have several meanings: territorial space; political space and the space of social interaction; economic space; functional space»79.

Identity is considered being a very versatile and controversial, capacious concept, which occupies a key place in the discourse of Kaliningrad (inside) and about Kaliningrad (from outside). The inevitable background of this discourse is the border modality of the region. If I turn to Barth, who pointed out that the differences between cultures, and their historic boundaries and connections, have been given much attention, I recognize that his study provided a significant impetus to expand the horizons of the state of research in the second half of the 20th century, with a focus on the «constitution of ethnic groups, and the nature of the boundaries between them»80, which have not been correspondingly investigated before. Opinion that the borders are «meaning-making and meaning-carrying entities, parts of cultural landscapes which often transcend the physical limits of the state and defy the power of state institutions»81 finds justification in a place like the ambivalent region of Kaliningrad.

Martinez82 based his concept of the borderlands milieu, on the study of the US-Mexico border. Such «milieu» can be affected by many cross-border and national factors, which can be grouped in such a way as to produce a typology of borderlands interaction. In the assumption of the concept of Matinez, depending on the political conjuncture the Kaliningrad region as borderland can be attributed to two groups. First, coexistent borderland is present when neighbouring states reduce tensions to a manageable level, and modest cross-border interaction occurs. Second is interdependent borderland, which involves a symbiotic relationship between border regions in adjacent countries. There is a binational economic, social and cultural system at work between the two border regions, and perhaps between their states, but a number of policies retain state separation at the boundary83. The existence of binational economic, social and cultural system at work on the level of the two border regions allows us to stress, that the Kaliningrad region nowadays can move towards the tendency of an interdependent borderland.

In the issue, anthropological research on border cultures contributes to our knowledge of identity formation84. Taking into account the concept of Martinez, it is worth to note that the Kaliningrad borderland is bears the imprint of ambivalence, which is reflected, cultivated and maintained in the mindsets of young Kaliningradians. Because of their transborder and transnational linkages, these border cultures are often treated suspiciously by states and their agents, many of whom believe in the traditional view of the convergence of state, nation, identity and territory85. As we know the stronger rulers belief was that strict control of the frontier was essential to the maintenance of their power86. The above is manifested in the Kaliningrad regional culture, forms it and affects the everyday practices.

It is certainly a commonplace in the interdisciplinary field of border studies that the border can only be conceptualized as being shaped and produced by a multiplicity of actors, movements and discourses. But most of these studies still perceive the practices of doing borderwork and making borders as «acts and techniques of state»87, more specifically state political institutions. Then from the empirical point, the politicization of cultural identity requires people to react against their own felt disadvantage and denigration, as well as occurring in characteristic economic and political circumstances88.

During my empirical study I asked my respondents about the format of interaction within political, economic and cultural dimensions in the space of the borderland region and whether it is legitimate to talk about the hierarchy or the interdependence of these measurements. I have collected very different answers, which made the basis of empirical research in the light of the idea that the culture is but one element in the definition and reproduction of a political system.

I consider the point of Strassoldo relevant who concluded that the ambivalence of border life is a defining feature of border societies in several respects89. Border people may demonstrate ambiguous identities because economic, cultural and linguistic factors pull them in two directions. They are also pulled two ways politically, and may display only a weak identification with the nation-state in which they reside. This ambivalent border identity affects the role that border communities play in international cooperation and conflict90. Everyday practice of young Kaliningradians and empirical research logically fall on this theoretical basis.

For Anderson, borders are both institutions and processes. Anderson also stresses that «borders are markers of identity, and have played a role in this century in making national identity the pre-eminent political identity of the modern state»91.

The frontiers are markers of identity, in the twentieth century usually of national identity, although political identities may be larger or smaller than the «nation» state. Frontiers, in this sense, are part of political beliefs and myths about the unity of the people and sometimes myths about the «natural» unity of a territory92. These «imagined communities», to use Anderson’s93 phrase, are now a universal phenomenon and often have deep historical roots. These communities are defined by imagined boundaries, if we follow Cohen’s remark, that «where cultural difference was formerly underpinned also by structural boundaries, these have now given way to boundaries which inhere in the mind: symbolic boundaries»94. To accept this assumption, we must proceed from the fact that «human consciousness and social organization are profoundly conditioned by territory and frontiers»95. I note the importance, of how Cohen estimates symbols as a resource for identity. According to his point of view they are «pragmatic devices which are invested with meaning through social process of one kind or another, they are potent resources in the arenas of politics and identity»96.

I share the view, that in certain circumstances the frontier acquired a mythic significance in building nations and political identities, becoming, as Anderson signalized, the mythomoteur of a whole society97.

For Barth98, ethnic groups are socially designed using individuals who adjust their cultural identity by emphasizing or underplaying it according to current context. Individuals can cross the boundaries between groups if they find it advantageous to do. Moreover they can maintain regular relations across them, but this does not affect the durability and stability of the boundaries themselves. Accordingly, «cultural emblems and differences are thus significant only in so far as they are socially effective, as an organizational device for articulating social relations»99.